A large body of scholarly reflection and critical interrogation has considered questions of the politics and ethics of historical, literary, cinematic and graphic representation of the victimisation of civilians in World War Two
the contrary, it is clear that questions about how the suffering and persecution of particular groups have been generalised to all of humanity go to the heart of the ambiguities in Górecki's artistic intention, and even more so in the morally dubious market reception of his work. The symphony no. 3 was commissioned as a war symphony for Polish victims of Nazism, and it explicitly references the suffering of an innocent female Polish Catholic civilian in a Nazi Gestapo prison cell. In its reception it has been encoded as a symphony about the victimisation of genocidal target groups more generally, and oddly, about the persecution of the Jews under Nazism more particularly.
That slippage, I will argue, is indeed part of a global marketing politics of the aestheticisation of the Holocaust. However, the recognition that 'Holocaust' suffering was not part of the intended references in Górecki's musical intention cannot be sustained as a defence of Górecki against the demand that his creation should be subject to the similar ethical considerations that have been applied to Jewish-specific World War Two artistic representation. The aestheticisation and dramatisation of suffering in the symphony give it a politics all its own in relation to the Polish post-communist context it prefigured. National-, religious-, and gender-specific themes in the symphony that reinscribe World War Two victimisation within Catholic traditions of piety make Perhaps no other historical phenomenon is so ethically fraught to represent and, in particular, to aestheticise, as World War Two. The German Frankfurt School philosopher Theodor Adorno was perhaps the first observer to suggest that the horrors of the war could not, or should not, be the subject of aesthetic representation at all (Adorno 1983: 34) . Numerous variations of the claim have been repeated by scholars, novelists, critics and essayists. In each case, the ethics and the possibility of representation are conflated, blurred or deliberately intertwined. The US literary critic George Steiner exemplified that position when he asserted that 'The world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside reason ' (quoted in Lang 1990: 151) , and that, 'It is by no means clear that there can be or that there ought to be, any form, style, or code of articulate, intelligible expression somehow adequate to the facts of the Shoah' (Steiner 1967: 199) . Berel Lang has asserted an ethical position around the failure of language in relation to the Holocaust, since a respectful silence is the only humanitarian response to the facts of such brutality and suffering (Lang 1990: 158-160 (Friedländer 1984) . Lanzmann, too, claimed that even posing the question of why Jews were killed by the Nazis 'immediately reveals its obscenity. There is indeed an absolute obscenity in the project of understanding' (Lanzmann 1990: 271) .
That view has been called into question for its censoring implication. Dominick LaCapra, for example, argues that Lanzmann's affirmation of a Bilderverbot (forbidding of images) extended to a kind of Warumverbot (forbidding of 'why?') around Holocaust representation, thus appearing both to 'sacralize the Holocaust and to surround it with taboos' (LaCapra 1997: 236). As Hayden White has remarked, the calls for reverent silence around genocide have haunted fictional representation of such events, making the necessity of distinguishing history from fiction even more acute in Holocaust debates than in other historiographic discussions about the disciplinary boundary separating historical from fictional truth (White 1992) . In Holocaust representation, the stakes are higher all round. Statements about the unrepresentability of the Holocaust are not only claims about the unthinkable magnitude of those horrors; they are also moral claims about the obscenity of representing them. In her The Fragility of Empathy After the Holocaust, Carolyn Dean demonstrates that the term pornographic has been used repeatedly by those criticising the moral ground of graphic depiction of suffering and victimisation in writing, art and cinema about the Holocaust, alongside claims about it as unspeakable (Dean 2004) . There are ethical dimensions and disputes, then, both to the representation of Holocaust violence and suffering, and to the statement about its impossibility.
Curiously, none of these concerns appear to have been raised in relation to musical representation. With so many critics asserting that the Holocaust is obscene to depict graphically and is unspeakable in literary and other verbal forms of expression, why, it might be asked, does no one seem to think that the suffering of World War Two victims is similarly un-singable? One way to address that question might be to argue that music has a unique capacity to represent that which is outside the limits of other forms of human expression. But that line of thought, however fruitful, would not help to explain Polish national frames of reference (Rusbridger 1993 ).
The universalist account of Górecki's no. 3 appears to be supported by its international popularity, but if credence in that view is suspended momentarily, then we might consider the more unique historical contexts relevant to the production and reception of the work. The Symphony no. 3 is about a particular someone's suffering in war: that is, a Polish national, feminine and Catholic pious form. And it contains verbal and conceptual content that is specific to the experience of persecuted Poles under Nazism.
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Its reception, as distinct from its content, has overwhelmingly been about the generation of a particular kind of compassionate response to World War Two, one that is heavily imbued with Catholic pathos and redemption, and which arguably encourages a collapsing of the listener's own emotional pain into an identification with the suffering of war victims. That argument would rely upon a view of music in the majority of its forms and genres as designed, above all (and more than any other kind of art), to make us feel something, as well as potentially making us think and move. But in that view, the use of music to reference historical events deemed too horrific to aestheticise in literary, filmic or graphic forms, would surely be even more problematic, given its potential to engender emotions without reflection, and identification without appropriate attribution of whose suffering is being represented. It might be protested that Górecki cannot be held responsible for the various visual glosses on his music; he has stated that he was mortified by Palmer's documentary ('Sorry Story' 1993: 82) . Luke Howard has argued that the view of Górecki's no. 3 as a symphony about war or the Holocaust is largely generated by its reception and marketing and not by the intentions and ideas of the composer himself. If the no. 3 is about anything, Howard argues, then it is about the sorrow of mothers (Howard 1998: 151) . Similarly, the biographer Adrian Thomas claims that while the no. 3 is 'concerned with inner sorrow and compassion,' it is 'no more connected with Auschwitz than it is with more recent barbarities' (Thomas 1997: 94) . But while the symphony no. 3 does not attempt to represent 'the Holocaust' in the way its popular reception has suggested, it does nonetheless make explicit reference to the Nazi persecution of civilians in World-War-Two Poland, where the majority of Nazi concentration camps were located, and where around 90 percent of the native Jewish population (3 million people) were killed, in addition to the 2.5-3 million non-Jewish Poles, and several million other
The Sorrowful Songs sensation
Europeans identified by the Nazis as Jewish, Romani, Slavic, or in other respects enemies of Nazi racial purification (Gross 2006: 4.) . Such a context appears in tension with Górecki's own insistence on the universality of his work. Clearly the symphony is indeed about the suffering of particular cultural subjects, located in a series of historical events, which are both uniquely famous and historiographically contested.
The claim to universalism may, in part, help to explain why there has been a striking lack of ethical or historiographic examination of the Górecki no. 3. But the fact that Górecki's choice of and remarks on this text suggest that the no. 3, in fact, is about something more than just the sorrow of mothers. Górecki has often explained why he chose the words of the second movement from among many other inscriptions carved on those cell walls by the prisoners held within them and that typically railed bitterly against the injustice of their treatment: The young woman's words revealed a selflessness; in spite of her own victimisation, the prisoner's thought is not for her own misery but for the pain that her death will cause her (biological or spiritual) mother (Górecki 2003) . In referencing Nazism's victims through this choice of text, the second movement invokes the power of compassion to transcend suffering-it is not merely about the love between mother and child, but about the freedom from despair afforded by an experience of kindness to others within the context of contemplating the victims of Nazism. The aesthetic and ethical pleasure this contemplation invokes, the tears it prompts, the rapturous statement of superlatives it inspires, have occured in response to a young Catholic woman's prayer, interpreted and presented by Górecki as an example of the highest moral and most elegantly sublime redemption.
The history of various musical interpretations of the Symphony no. 3 also suggests something about both Górecki's intentions and the significance of the work's reception.
In spite of having a discernible Anglophone accent in her articulation of Górecki's Polish lyrics, the composer commended Dawn Upshaw for the demure and understated vocal style she has brought to recordings of the symphony, similar to that of the Polish soprano and Mozart specialist Teresa Zylis-Gara, for whom the part was originally written, and unlike Stefania Woytowicz, whose more dramatic style dominated the earliest recordings of the work (Howard 1998: 142 ). Upshaw's less powerful voice, her sweeter tonality and restrained vibrato, suggest something about the feminine persona
Górecki imagined this vocal part to embody: the imprisoned girl of the second movement, like the Virgin Mary of the first movement, and the lamenting mother of the third movement, weeps peacefully, not angrily, graciously, not bitterly; she is noble, morally commendable and beautiful in her suffering. In a transcript from a rehearsal of the work in 1997 Górecki is noted responding to comments from listeners in the audience who remarked that the soprano was swamped by the orchestra in the opening of the first movement; she is supposed to be swamped, he replies, and only later in the movement should her voice rise above the pitch of the orchestra as she climbs upward into the more resonant zone of her range (Górecki 2003) . This corresponds to the division of the score between the opening vocal entry, with its simple two note descending motif in which the girl calls out to her mother despairingly, as any young person facing death might be expected to do, and the brighter rising sequence of notes, which corresponds to the lyrical revelation that the mother is invoked, not so that the girl might take solace from her, but so that she might give it instead. The simple semiotic message of these contrasted passages is transparent. In her suffering, the victim is overwhelmed, but in her piety and selflessness she transcends her suffering and attains resonance and perfection. The ability of her voice to rise above the orchestra in the climax (both in pitch and in volume) designates religious self-sacrifice, selflessness and compassion for others as the keys to transcending suffering. The Ave Maria prayer component of the lyrics coincides with a monotone resolution settling into the major key-her voice is steady, while the orchestral parts dwindle out in an eerie minor key.
In completing her invocation the victim, then, is at peace, at one with god in the feminine aspect of Mary, and she maintains her spirit even as the dark events of her imprisonment loom threateningly around her.
The Catholic aestheticisation of Polish suffering in Górecki's work is also one of the points through which the symphony should be interrogated in relation to ethical discussions of Holocaust representation. One possible auditory interpretation of the second movement of the symphony no. 3 might note its hasty leap to redemption, which follows rapidly after the evocation of despair. In a study of documentary and other filmic representation, the intellectual historian Dominick La Capra has criticised accounts of the Holocaust that imbue it with a mystical sublimity, beyond cognition, or that attempt to make it into a sad story in which everything is rectified in the end.
Redemption, La Capra insists, is the one thing that any work of art that references to World War Two should avoid giving us, since it serves to occlude the traumatic abyss that those events represent to those who survived them (LaCapra 2000: 179) . By that measure, then, the Górecki's no. 3 is a dubious exemplar of how we might respond to World War Two suffering. Its Catholic dimension enables the automatic redemption following each articulation of despair. Its epic quality connotes the sublime-that which is beyond the capacities of thought or speech to contain; and, its relentless lentissimo suggests a patience (or an indulgence) to remain within the vulnerable sadness it evokes.
The hopeful sweetness of its rising note progressions reassure us that if only we weep, then everything will be alright. That is not a universal response to victimisation, but rather a particularly religious one. Contemplation of World War Two horrors may only feel redemptive to those who believe that the innocent and the righteous will be saved, and that the evil ones will pay for their sins by the will of some divine moral arbiter. But why then has the Górecki no. 3 had such a massive power to seduce even those who do not subscribe to his own Catholicism, or to other compatible religious world-views?
Solace and redemption are clearly appealing tropes to a range of audiences, and the 'abyss' of World War Two suffering may indeed not be any easier for atheists to contemplate.
Catholic suffering under Nazism
The Catholicism of Górecki's evocation of Nazi atrocity, then, may be one of the least appropriate spiritual frameworks through which to approach the human questions (Steiner 1967) . But Górecki's sad songs suggest concerns about another kind of representation of genocide, all the more insidious for its sweetness: Musical evocation of compassion for the suffering of others in war has the potential to encourage a pleasurable sadness derived from the collapsing of our emotions into an imagination of historical subjects' suffering. Feeling good, feeling ourselves to be 'good' because we weep for the pain of others, we turn away from the horror of reality and make an object of solace and satiation from their suffering.
In accepting universalist denials of the cultural specificity of expressions of pain, spirituality and transcendence, we risk ignoring the messier memory contexts in which all works of art about World War Two emerge.
